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Rupture and continuity
Fidesz and the Hungarian revolutionary tradition
Emilia Palonen
1 Revolutions  come  and  go  in  Hungary,  a  country  whose  population  and  literary  and
political elites cherish its revolutionary tradition. These are events in the national history
that the Hungarians invest with pride. There is no rupture in the spirit of revolution, it
seems, but revolutions are set in a historical continuum. At each revolutionary moment,
the spirit of a choice of previous revolutions is evoked. Paradoxically, then the idea of a
rupture that revolution presents becomes a continual element in Hungary. 
2 While one could discuss the significance of this in the cultural life of Hungary and the
understanding of history, whether we might term it history consciousness, knowledge of
the past, or the cultural history of the present, this study looks at the significance of
revolutions in contemporary politics in Hungary. Yet, as politics in Hungary has been
heavily focused on cultural identity building, political articulation has its effects on the
cultural  life  of  the  country  and  especially  government  sponsored  productions  and
commemoration.  Discussing  ruptures  and  continuity  in  the  Hungarian  revolutionary
tradition, the paper thus deals with politics of memory.
3 Twenty years after the first free elections in Hungary, the ethos of revolution is still
present in the country. The year of that shook Eastern Europe as much as the West, 1989,
was  marked  by  events,  which  were  related  to  a  range  of  the  previous  revolutions.
Revolution,  however,  was  very  much present  in  the  rhetoric  of  the  Hungarian right
during the election year 2010. The paper seeks to discuss the way in which revolution – or
revolutions of  1989,  1956,  and 1848 – have been present in contemporary Hungarian
politics. 
4 In  particular,  the  focus  is  on  the  articulation  of  the  revolution  by  Fidesz.  While  in
government 1998–2002 it related to the above mentioned revolutions in building their
political  discourse and project.  This paper looks at the speeches of  Viktor Orbán the
leader of Fidesz, the largest party in Hungary, which took landslide victories in both the
parliamentary elections in April 2010 and local elections in October 2010. This is why such
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an endeavour in recent political history is also vital for present evaluations of Fidesz
politics, policy, identity and politics of memory. 
5 The paper investigates the ideological traces in this articulation. It looks at the way in
which incoherent sets of contested concepts are adopted as part of a party discourse,
using a discourse theoretical framework developed by Ernesto Laclau1.
 
Revolutionary tradition
6 To get a grasp of a claimed “revolutions” of the present, one must know the ruptures of
the past, their hierarchies and political baggage. Revolutions have been key objects of
political rhetoric throughout the history of Hungary, and different political forces have
been investing certain political meanings and evaluations to them. Thus, in the present,
they evoke the values, they have been invested upon. At each moment of articulation, the
meaning and values of the revolution are reassigned in novel ways. Yet, if we made a
chart that captures some of the significations of the revolutions at given moments and
ownership, it could be outlined as follows:
 
Figure 1. Revolutions and their reference
1514 Peasant Revolution of György Dózsa Especially important 1949-1989
1848 Spring of Nations All parties claim different heroes
1919 Soviet Republic of Béla Kún Especially important 1949-1989
1956 Revolution against Soviets of Imre Nagy After 1990 mainly Hungarian left/liberals
1989 Revolution against State Socialism Some argue was not a revolution
7 As  the  chart  shows,  revolutionary  tradition  has  also  been  a  key  nodal  point  in  the
discourse of the Hungarian Socialists at all eras. Each party would choose their icons from
the canon of the heroes of the revolution 1848: this is how they could frame the meaning
of that revolution in their own liking. Revolutionary heroes have their own meanings and
following. In another context I have been discussing the way in which the liberal Mayor
of  Budapest  (1990-2010),  Gábor  Demszky  gave  speeches  on  a  day  celebrating  1848
revolution, the Spring of Nations in Hungary, by the statue of the revolutionary poet
Petôfi,  and outlined the political  situation and the direction of  his politics,  including
relationships to other parties2. Similar affinity to a chosen hero can be witnessed in other
political parties and by other politicians3.
 
Poststructuralist method
8 This  essay  follows  a  poststructuralist  methodological  thinking,  which  is  crucial  for
understanding the way in which meanings of the ruptures and continuities are made. It
starts, drawing from structural linguistics, from the presupposition that any revolution is
a signifier invested with meaning, whose meanings do change over time. Furthermore
each meaning is relational.  Yet,  these structures are rearticulated, connections made,
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renewed and broken in each moment of articulation. They are articulated by different
actors and during different periods. As Jacques Derrida has demonstrated, the readings or
reception of these articulations varies independent of the author’s original intentions4.
What follows from this, is that for a researcher interested in the political aspects of this
meaning-making process, there are a number or interesting issues to be studied.
9 The  discourse  theoretical  approach  proposed  by  Ernesto  Laclau  and  his  colleagues,
otherwise named ideology and discourse analysis, has developed sets of analytical tools
drawing from the  structural  linguistics,  literary,  deconstructive  and psychoanalytical
traditions5. Signifier, for Laclau, refers to a moment when a concept is overloaded with
meaning that its own particular meaning becomes diluted or overshadowed by all the
other reference points6. By no means would it be empty. Rather the opposite, it is filled
with all  kinds of particular meanings.  Yet,  its tendential  emptiness or potentiality to
carry all the weight of the signified elements, offers a possibility for a specific kind of
articulation: bringing together a number of elements under a single header. Thinking
with our case in question, thus, revolutions may signify many relatively different things –
or act  as shared points of  identification for a wide range of  groups and people with
different views or reasons to identify with it. Maintaining such a multifaceted references
is  not  easy,  however,  and  observing  politics  of  meaning  making  one  observes  the
potential collapse of such empty signifiers as well as their emergence and maintenance.
10 Sometimes the words we use do not appear to be empty,  but their meanings change
depending on their  use  or  users.  ‘Floating  signifiers’  offer  another  perspective:  they
indicate the way in which meanings of a given signifier are being competed over. Two or
more groups may propose an alternative reading of a revolutionary event, for instance.
They could also offer differing moral evaluations of the event. The ‘floating’ captured by
this analytical tool, implies that the signifier is tied to two different discourses, where its
meaning would be structured around different sets of  elements.  An element,  such as
revolution, could be seen as both floating and empty depending on the issue which one
wants to clarify with this usage7.
11 This paper does not discuss what constitutes a revolution or whether a given event in
Hungary was a revolution or not. It discusses how revolution, rupture and continuity are
used as rhetorical tools in political argumentation. What are the ranges of meanings they
evoke or contest? What is their function in the course of the political events? Yet, it may
be worthwhile noting that Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s writings have emphasised
the way in which revolutions are more events of continuity and illusions of rupture than
commonly thought – especially in the (post-)Marxist framework where they have been
drawing from. We may return to this at the end of the paper.
 
Postcommunist politics: “revolution” of 1989
12 The year of 1989 was supposed to present a new start for Hungary, the ultimate rupture
from the previous era. National flags with a hole cut to remove the Soviet-style emblem
were visible symbols that represented the break from the communist era. For the first
time  in  Hungary  a  non-authoritarian  and  non-communist  regime  was  established.
Nevertheless, the revolution in 1989 was in many ways not a rupture but a continuum.
13 It was a “refolution”, as Timothy Garton Ash famously named the negotiated revolutions
in late 1980s Central Europe that more resembled reforms8. The changes had been under
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way throughout the 1980s. The ruling party was dominated by reformists who were eager
to  retain power  but  pushed through economic  and some political  reforms.  Dissident
groups were included in the round-table talks, and organised later into political parties.
This brought in an element of continuity to the newly established political system and
party differentiation.
14 Furthermore,  the  year  of  1989  was  termed  as  marking  the  “return  to  nationhood”.
Especially nationally focused dissident groups claimed that expressions of nationhood
were  not  allowed  under  the  foreign  rule.  Now,  finally  national  feelings  could  be
expressed. Foreign yoke was gone. Hungary was free. As George Schöpflin explained, “the
task of the new nationally minded government was to act as protectors of the Hungarian
nation, regardless where its members lived”9.  One of the issues that emerged was the
situation of ethnic Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries, and this the first
Hungarian government of József Antall focused upon in 1990-1994. As patriotism has been
emphasising civic pride in the socialist state, ethnic pride was seen as a problem. Return
to nationhood was a return of ethnicity. In extreme cases and for some, this was not
unlike  a  return  to  the  interwar  period’s  calls  of  unification  of  the  Hungarian  lands
(irredentism of the extreme right).
15 The events of the year 1989 was also a moment of celebration of the heroes of the failed
revolution of 1956, the moment when the change hoped for and anticipated in 1956 could
finally happen: the restoration of shattered dreams of democracy. This was symbolised in
the numerous spontaneous memorials and tombstones but also in the official celebrations
and reburials. The most notable of the reburials was that of Imre Nagy, the PM of the
reform government of 1956, whose legacy was claimed by the political forces of 198910. A
young student, Viktor Orbán, delivered a memorable speech at the reburial of Nagy. He
has been the sole top-rate politician who has made it through 20 years of postcommunism
and returned to the post of the PM of the Hungarian government in 2010.
16 Ultimately, the events of 1989 were seen in a larger continuum of Hungarian revolutions.
They were not a sudden, exceptional rupture, but part of a national tradition. Their status
as revolution has been put in question by political forces. In any case, revolution of 1989
has been a key reference point in postcommunist era for which it offers a constitutive
break from the previous regime.
 
Revolution and difference in postcommunist politics 
17 The postcommunist political parties differentiated from each other by their relationship
to previous revolutions.  Already in 1990 the Hungarian Democratic Forum decided to
disassociate itself from Imre Nagy – whom they considered a Socialist, after all. As the
leading party of the first postcommunist government, they claimed their revolution was
much more of a break than Nagy’s revolution. Imre Nagy’s revolution was commemorated
by  the  state  only  in  1996  when three  memorials  for  1956  were  erected  around  the
Hungarian parliament under a Socialist-liberal government.
18 When the small liberal party Free Democrats joined the landslide-winning Socialists as a
junior partner in the government in 1994, revolution seemed to be annulled for many.
Socialists were inheritors of the reformist wing of pre-1989 regime. Now they were back
in power, to restore Hungarian economy, and many saw liberals as having betrayed their
cause.  For  their  most  prominent  political  opponent,  Fidesz who took the position of
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Democratic Forum as the leading party of the Hungarian right, the socialist era with the
previous  socialist-led  government  (1994–98)  had  just  been  a  rupture  in  the  real
community of Hungarian politics: that of right-wing rule.
19 In 1998, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz came to power in another landslide. But for the Hungarian
left  the right-wing rule presented a continuum of  interwar authoritarianism or even
feudalism, and their campaign in 2002 was to provide a rupture to that. In a tight election
campaign 2002, Fidesz lost narrowly to the Socialists, who kept in power for a second
term in 2006, but lost control after corruption cases, lies and ailing economy in 2010. This
paper deals specifically with the revolutionary rhetoric of Fidesz, and it focuses on their
terms in office.
 
Fidesz and revolution 1989–2006
20 Effective mobilisation is one of the important features of Fidesz politics. It has been a
populist radical party from its foundations in 1989 to the present. It differed from the
other party of the liberal pole of 1990s, Free Democrats in which many of the young
politicians’ mentors came from. The name of the party was originally Young Democrats’
Association where the name FiDeSz comes from, and the membership was limited to
those under 30 years. It wanted very strongly to make a distinction between the old elites
and  themselves.  After  all,  in  reform  communism  such  as  the  regime  in  Hungary
practically everyone was party of the system. Fidesz was a revolutionary anti-system
party and they were hugely popular among the youth from the start.
21 Since the beginning Fidesz, established in March 1988, they have grounded themselves on
the myths of the national revolutions: the system of reference. Viktor Orbán started the
speech that gained him national fame at the reburial of Imre Nagy June 1989 stating:
“Since the Russian occupation and communist dictatorship started 40 years ago, there has
been only once an open chance, only once there was enough courage and strength, for
undertake the aims set already in 1848: national independence and political freedom”. He
also questioned the claims made by politicians to be representing the heritage of Nagy.
“No one believes, that the party controlled state would change by itself”, he stressed
calling for a revolution11.
22 Another revolution was set  in 1998,  when Fidesz had gained the space left  by ailing
conservative party, Hungarian Democratic Forum, and emerged as the largest party of the
right. One of the arguments for Fidesz contesting the democratically elected Socialist-
Liberal  government’s  rule  in  1998  had been that  they  are  not  national  enough.  The
Millennium coincided with the celebrations of thousand years of Hungarian statehood,
which was a government sponsored project of quite heavy effort, visibility and budget.
23 Fidesz  also  named  the  Millennium  package  after  a hero  of  1848  revolution,  István
Széchenyi, who had been named by a commemorative law as the “Greatest Hungarian”
and was a moderate progressive figure. Through him, Fidesz rearticulated revolution and
made connection between it and the party’s own politics. The victory over the left-wing
government was seen as a revolution, and a moment of establishment of a new order with
a vision of new civic (polgári) Hungary, whose roots were in the 19th century reformer
Széchenyi’s heritage. The notion polgári seemed to capture as an empty signifier both
moderation, civicness, bourgeoisness, and revolutionary force12.  Thus, in a paradoxical
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way in  which  Fidesz  articulated  simultaneously  their  heritage  as  the  bearers  of  the
“Hungarian civic tradition” and the revolutionary flair: ruptures and continuity. 
24 Statesman-like Viktor Orbán and Fidesz mobilised on the new vision of Hungary, but this
seemed to many scary, expensive or too nationalistic, Fidesz lost the elections and had to
move  to  the  opposition.  The  competition  was  over  nationhood,  which,  as  a  floating
signifier,  gained different  content  from two sides  of  the  political  spectrum –  ethnic
nationhood  and  outspoken  polgári Hungarianness  on  the  right  and  state-bounded
nationhood and security on the left.
25 Being in the opposition offered Fidesz a perfect  ground for returning to their  roots:
populist confrontation and popular mobilisation. They established village-parliaments,
national consultations and collected enough signatures for referenda. Still, they lost the
elections in 2006. The aftermath of the elections, however, offered a perfect moment for
another revolution. The moment for the revolution presented itself to the opposition and
Fidesz after the Socialist Prime Minister Ferencs Gyurcsány admitted to having lied about
the budget deficit prior to the general elections. Streets were filled with people calling for
the PM to step down. Fidesz saw a possibility for its own mobilisation, and moved on to
revolutionary rhetoric.  They had a landslide victory in the local  elections already in
autumn 2006.
 
Fidesz and “revolution” in 2010
26 To some extent, Fidesz mobilised for following general elections in 2010 in the name of
revolution. The main opposition party gained a landslide victory, and took the leading
position in government in the elections of 2010, first time since 2002. The term revolution
was mentioned to characterise the political developments beyond the party usage. For
example,  the national  left-wing daily  called it  in  June a  voters’  revolution,  referring
perhaps to the fact that many of the former left-wing voters did not go to the polls13. The
victory of Fidesz at the local elections in Autumn 2010 was referred again in October as
“the most recent revolution at the urns”14. To bring flesh to the most recent “revolution”,
five speeches have been carefully selected for discourse analysis from Orbán’s online
speech archives. Each of these can be considered among the key speeches during the year,
and taking an epoch-marking perspective in that they reflect on their era.
27 In a speech on the twentieth anniversary of the revolution in Timisoara, Romania on 4
December 2009, Viktor Orbán stressed that there are lessons to be learned from the past
twenty years. One of these was the claim that democracy and market do not work on
their own – without state or society’s control. The liberal economic position of leaving it
all to the invisible hand had been the claim of the left in Hungary, so there was a lot of
space on the statist side. Rather than overall change, Orbán argued for moderation: “This
knowledge would be the guideline, showing to us what and how we must change after the
next elections”15.
28 Ten days later in the Party meeting on the elections, Orbán argued that Jobbik was a
Trojan horse claiming to be on the right and the Gyurcsány government had turned its
back on the people. This would be the first thing to change: turn towards “people” (
emberek, rather than nation or Hungarians). Referring to the Hungarian Socialist Party
through the previous PM Gyurcsány, Orbán was pointing out to the liar whose name had
become notorious. Furthermore, stressing that the Party still had the “Gyurcsány flag”,
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he claimed that nothing had changed despite the change of a new leader. Orbán argued
that what has been heard in Hungary over the last eight years is “there is no other way”
or “cannot do otherwise”. This had to change: “just imagine how should it be heard in
Angela Merkel’s Germany or Sarkozy’s France, and how we heard 1989 and prior to our
victory in 1998”. It is the time to end the Gyurcsány era, Orbán concluded calling for
justice16.
29 In his  opening speech of  the year 2010 in Budapest Orbán made a long reference to
Emerson, Lake and Palmer’s song. In the lengthy speech he still insisted that end should
come to the Gyurcsány era. The current affairs cannot go on. He stood against the current
form of finance capitalism (pénzkapitalizmus) but also against the “one-way-road” of
anticapitalism. The next government should build the economy from a different basis on
the values of: work, home, family, and health. He emphasised social security and the love
of fellow nationals (following an ethnic conception of the nation). This was not in fact a
particularly revolutionary speech but in one thing: changing eras. The reference to ELP of
his youth was providing a link to the past in this call for rupture17.
30 In the election speech from after the first round on 11 April 2010, the revolution was
much more present. Orbán made a clear and explicit connection to 1956 and 1990. “In
1956  judgement  was  made  on  communist  dictatorship  opting  for  freedom.  In  1956
Hungarians made a judgement on the party-state system and opted for democracy. In
2010 judgement is made upon the failed era, choosing health, order and security”. Orbán
went even further: “We wish You do everything you can to make 2010 to follow in the line
of the important dates of the Hungarian nation”. This revolution was not about rupture
only: it was about continuity18.
31 “Revolution”  was  on  the  heading  of  Orbán’s  speech  after  the  elections.  The  results
showed  68  percent  support  for  the  Fidesz  and  Christian  Democratic  People’s  Party
electoral coalition. He returned to the idea that the twenty years had been a time for
important lessons. The first lesson was that “one cannot change the system; the system
can only be overthrown and demolished, demolished for new to be established in its
place”. “This is what happened today”. In other words, there was not a system change, as
the 1989/90 in Hungary provided, but a revolution, in Orbán’s mind19.
 
Revolution as a myth and fantasy
32 The understanding of revolution as a radical break which would start a completely new
era is contested by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe already in their work from the
1980s20. Those speaking in the name of a revolution only reproduce power relations from
another perspective. Thus, what is needed is the assessment of how the revolutionary
break is done and signified rearticulating existing points references. 
33 Laclau in his  New Reflections  on  Revolutions  of  Our  Time made a  distinction between a
“myth” and “imaginary”, as analytical tools to conceptualise meaning-making21. Myths
are  frequent  reference  points  in  a  shared  community,  where  as  imaginary  is  the
overarching horizon – a strong myth which becomes to play role as a reference point to
most argumentation in a given community. It fixes the boundaries of a community, the
group of those who share the reference point. In the case of Hungary, 1956 emerged in
1989 as an imaginary that everyone shared. It was shattered, however, as its status was
questioned. 1848, by contrast still works as an imaginary. On one level, one might argue
Rupture and continuity
La Révolution française , Rupture(s) en Révolution | 2011
7
that the whole revolutionary tradition – the need to make references to revolutions of the
past in the activities that are presented as revolutionary of the present.
34 Myths or imaginaries do not exist by themselves, but are products of articulation: to exist
they  have  to  be  referred  to.  Hungarian  politicians  –  especially  Viktor  Orbán,  whose
speeches have been studied here – have been maintaining the memory and ethos of
revolutions in Hungarian public life. The contest from the extreme right Jobbik, the third
largest party in Hungary as of 2010, has been that 1989 never was a revolution but the
same elites continued what was there before. Each change of government has been a
revolution  of  sorts,  changing  rapidly  and  quite  drastically  policies  and  personnel.
Different political forces – from the Fidesz to the Hungarian Guard and Jobbik – call for a
revolution. 
 
Conclusions
35 Thinking  of  revolutions,  ruptures  and  continuities,  it  is  obvious  from our  case  that
revolution is not a mere rupture. Revolution is not a sudden unanticipated change, but
something that has been built from bottom up mobilisation – otherwise we could talk
about a coup, as in Romania in 198922. It claims to provide a change, but there will always
be legacies of the past that continue in the time to follow. Rather, it is an ideal that has
roots and precedence. In the case of Hungary, any revolution seems to have been deeply
rooted  in  the  previous  revolutionary  experiences.  Therefore,  it  presents  rather  a
continuity  than  a  mere  rupture.  Each  revolution  is  tied  to  a  chain  of  previous  and
subsequent revolutions. Revolution loses its singularity, even as it is named a revolution
and related to similar events in this category23.
36 If revolution was a total or totalising change, the previous reference points would be
radically altered. The relationships between signifiers and signifieds, structures between
elements that make up meaning would be broken. Such a stark dislocation would imply a
chaotic situation, which is unsustainable. After the revolution meanings would be fixed
anew.  In  the  conditions  of  often  reoccurring  “revolutions”,  change  –  or  even
overthrowing  and  demolishing  –  becomes  the  habitual  rather  than  exceptional.  The
concept of revolution becomes devaluated.
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ABSTRACTS
Le concept de révolution joue un rôle important dans la vie politique hongroise, qu’il traduise un
sentiment de continuité  ou de rupture.  L’écriture de l’histoire  de la  Hongrie  s’est  opérée en
mettant l’accent sur l’idée d’un continuum historique entrecoupé de révolutions.  Ce sont ces
dernières que les élites politiques parvenues au pouvoir ont interprété tour à tour à leur façon.
Ainsi, la victoire électorale éclatante du parti Fidesz au printemps 2010 – qui lui a donné une
majorité  parlementaire  historique  lui  offrant  même  la  possibilité  d’effectuer  des  révisions
constitutionnelles  –  a  été  bâtie  sur  l’idée  de  « révolution »  puis  nommée  rétrospectivement
comme telle. En adoptant une approche théorique du discours inspirée par le travail d’Ernesto
Laclau, cette communication entend montrer comment le concept de « révolution » a agi dans la
vie  politique  hongroise  à  la  fois  comme  un  signifiant  diffus  (« a  floating  signifier »  selon  la
terminologie de Laclau) et un mythe. La révolution se voit ainsi attribuer de nouveaux sens et est
renvoyée à différents contextes afin de légitimer le changement tout en entretenant l’illusion de
la continuité avec la tradition politique nationale – tandis qu’elle formule cette tradition elle-
même. En définitive,  il  s’agit  d’aborder le paradoxe selon lequel,  dans ces circonstances,  une
révolution est considérée comme une rupture.
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